Foreword
The gradual opening of India's capital account in the 1990s has changed the external sector dynamics in India. Growing integration with the world economy has introduced new macroeconomic influences, making the task of macroeconomic management that much more challenging. This paper by Renu Kohli attempts to analyse the patterns and trends in capital flows into India in the 1990s and how these have affected the key macroeconomic variables in the economy. It also attempts to study the response of the policy makers to the new challenges posed by the partial capital account liberalisation.
The paper finds that an inflow of foreign capital during this period has resulted in real exchange rate appreciation and has had a significant impact on domestic money supply. During a capital surge, these effects have been countered through intervention and sterilisation. The costs of these policies in the event of heavy inflows of foreign capital into India are spelt out in the paper.
I hope that the analysis and policy issues raised in this paper will help generate further research and discussion.
I Introduction
The last decade has witnessed a tremendous increase in the mobility of international capital. Cross-country trends in capital flows reveal that private capital flows now dominate with official capital flows reduced to a trickle. Simultaneously, a rise in portfolio capital has tilted the composition of international capital flows towards short-term investments, exposing individual countries to enhanced volatility and sudden withdrawal risks. These have been driven both by strong trends towards globalisation, which has enabled pursuit of higher returns and portfolio diversification, and the marketoriented reforms in many countries, which have liberalised access to financial markets.
Concurrent with these trends has been the rising incidence of financial crises, raising questions about linkages between the two. Concern has also been expressed as to whether the costs of increased vulnerability to financial fragility might not outweigh the gains from financial integration. Notwithstanding these doubts, most countries continue to progress in dismantling capital controls to integrate their financial markets with the rest of the world, albeit more cautiously.
These developments have stimulated a keen interest in understanding the nature and economic effects of capital flows as well as the appropriate policy responses to safeguard against financial instability that appears to be associated with international capital mobility. Capital flows affect a wide range of economic variables such as exchange rates, interest rates, foreign exchange reserves, domestic monetary conditions as well as savings and investments. Some commonly observed effects of capital inflows that have been documented in recent studies 1 include real exchange rate appreciation, stock market and real estate boom, reserve accumulation, monetary expansion as well as effects on production and consumption. Empirical studies that have begun to appear on the subject assess the impact of capital inflows upon output growth (Gruben and McLeod, 1996 2 ), differential macroeconomic effects of portfolio and foreign direct investment (Gunther, Moore and Short, 1996) and effects upon monetary conditions, savings and investment (Kamin and Wood, 1998) .
These issues are significant for India as it gradually opens its capital account as part of its broader financial liberalisation strategy. Before 1991, India had a closed capital account with capital mobility being restricted through administrative controls and outright prohibition. These controls were influenced by the balance of payments situation, exchange rate movements and India's import-substituting pattern of development. In the aftermath of the balance-of-payments crisis in 1991, India embarked upon an economic reform programme aimed at transforming the controlled economy into a market-driven one. Following changes in exchange rate regime as well as trade and investment policies' reform, there was a spurt in capital flows into the country between 1992/93-97/98. Though the magnitude of these flows is relatively insignificant in a crosscountry perspective, the pattern and composition of these flows conforms to trends observed in other emerging markets. India also shares some attributes with these emerging economies, a fact that enables a comparative assessment. For example, like 1 many Asian and Latin American countries, which were at various stages of macroeconomic stabilisation and/or financial liberalisation, when capital started flowing into these economies towards the end of the eighties, India is a liberalising economy too.
Notable differences persist, for example, India exhibits far lower openness than these countries and still retains strict capital controls, specifically on outflows.
The above context motivates the aim of this paper. It attempts three things. First, it documents trends in movement and composition of capital flows into India in a comparative perspective. Two, it examines the impact of these flows upon the key macroeconomic variables in the economy, as well as the policy responses of the Indian authorities. Three, it dwells on implications for economic policy. Corresponding to these objectives, the paper is organised into four sections. Section II traces trends in capital inflows into India since the onset of liberalisation, Section III assesses the impact of these flows while Section IV discusses the policy implications and concludes.
II Trends and Composition of Capital Flows
Fig 1 plots the trends in net capital inflows (sum of FDI, portfolio, loans and resident Indian deposits) into India between 1985-98. The plot shows a recovery of net capital inflows that had begun to decline in the late eighties and bottomed out in the 1991 1992-95 and 1996-97. 3 This is similar to the experiences of other emerging economies in Asia and Latin America, all of who typically experienced a rise in inward foreign capital following market-oriented reforms. The magnitude of capital flows into India is much smaller though; the peak level for India is 3.5 per cent of GDP in 1993-94, which is small when compared to other emerging markets. For instance, the peak levels are above 20 per cent for Malaysia, 13 per cent for Thailand, 10 per cent for the Philippines and almost 10 per cent for Singapore between 1990-93 (Glick, 1998: 4-5) . 4 Second, the swing in the capital account observed in the case of other emerging economies is not visible for India so far. Khan & Reinhart (1995) estimate a change in the capital account from -2.4 per cent (GDP) on an average between 1984-89 to 1.6 per cent (1990-93) for ten Latin American countries and from 1.6 3 Since then capital flows have been on a declining trend; both portfolio and FDI flows have not reached the peak level of 1995.
4
Net private capital flows to emerging markets increased seven-fold between 1990 and 1996 (Glick, 1998: 4-5 These figures exclude years 1990-91 due to the balance of payments crisis as a result of which there was extensive capital flight of non-resident Indian capital from India (See Economic Survey, 1990 -91, 1991 . See Chuhan, Claessens & Mamingi (1993) and Hernandez & Rudolph (1995) who document the role of domestic factors in attracting capital flows. Recent research by Bohn and Tesar (1998) assesses the role of local versus global 'push' factors in this context and finds that the former was relatively more important in determining US investment in Asian markets.
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Currency realignment has been offered as another explanation for stimulating capital flows by Goldberg & Klein (1998) . Khan & Reinhart (1995) note that reasons vary across Latin America and Asia; for instance, external factors have been more important for the former group. 1993 Q3 1994 Q1 1994 Q3 1995 Q1 1995 Q3 1996 Q1 1996 Q3 1997 Q1 1997 Q3 1998 Q1 1998 Q3 1999 Q1 1999 Q3 2000 Q1 Lending differential is the difference between the prime lending rate and libor the interest rate spread between the prime lending rate in India and Libor between 1993-2000. The interest spread narrows rapidly from 1993, mainly because of a movement towards lower interest rates after deregulation rather than arbitrage. Foreign investors were allowed to invest in debt instruments in 1997 (subject to a 30% ceiling on total investment) and government treasury bills in 1998. Though it is inappropriate to interpret the trends in interest differentials without allowing for expectations regarding exchange rate changes, superficial evidence does suggest that the relatively high differential rate of return on Indian assets might have played a role in attracting foreign capital after the opening of financial markets. to operate in the Indian capital market; these investments, initially restricted to equity, were subsequently relaxed to include debt, including government bonds.
Simultaneously, raising external resources abroad by domestic corporates was selectively liberalised. 13 These developments are partly reflected in the growing demand of institutional and private investors abroad, which has facilitated depository issues in the US and Europe and equity purchases by foreign institutional investors on the domestic stock exchanges (Table 2 ). Equity investment has been an important channel for portfolio inflows in other emerging markets too. Table 2 shows that the volume of bond issues has increased after 1991. These changes are consistent with evidence available for other emerging markets in Asia, where bond issues nearly quadrupled between 1989 and 1992 (Khan & Reinhart, 1995: 18) and continued to increase beyond this period.
13
This can be observed under the heading commercial borrowings in Table 1 . These are closely monitored by the authorities, with annual limits on borrowings. Only companies with a proven track record are permitted to raise capital abroad through depository issues.
The composition of foreign capital is by now well understood to make a difference in impact. Thus short-term or portfolio capital, which is subject to 'sudden reversal' and is, therefore, more volatile, renders the recipient country extremely 
III Capital Flows and Macroeconomic Aggregates
This section examines the impact of capital inflows upon important macroeconomic aggregates following liberalisation. Several studies, notably Corbo & Hernandez (1994) , Calvo, Leidermann & Reinhart (1994) and Khan & Reinhart (1995) , amongst others, have documented these effects for Latin America and East Asia. Some commonly observed effects of capital inflows are exchange rate appreciation, monetary
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The post-1991 period is also concomitant with regulatory, institutional and other changes in the capital market. In part, these measures have also contributed to the upward trend in stock market prices through increase in investor confidence and attracting greater funds.
expansion, rise in bank lending if the flows are intermediated through banks and effects upon savings and investment. This section considers the effects of capital flows upon the exchange rate, foreign exchange reserves and money supply (sterilisation) and the policy responses of the authorities.
Exchange Rate Appreciation:
In theory, an inflow of foreign capital will raise the level of domestic expenditure in the economy, raising the demand for non-tradable goods that results in an appreciation of the real exchange rate. The price-adjustment process then leads to a reallocation of resources from tradable to non-tradable goods and a switching of expenditures in favour of non-tradables. The rise in aggregate expenditure also increases the demand for tradables, leading to a rise in imports and a widening of the trade deficit. The transmission channel of the real exchange rate appreciation will however, depend on the exchange rate regime. With a floating exchange rate and no central bank intervention, the appreciation will take place through a nominal appreciation, but in a fixed exchange rate regime, the appreciation will work through an expansion in the domestic money supply, aggregate demand and the prices of nontradables. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 nominal effective exchange rate real effective exchange rate policy response was directed towards encouraging capital outflows through early servicing of external debt. India's external adjustment was also facilitated by the timing of these inflows as they coincided with trade reform, convertibility of the current account and liberalisation of overseas investments by Indian firms, measures which were partly financed by the net increase in capital assets during this period.
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For a complete discussion on macroeconomic policy response to capital inflows during this period, see Economic Survey, 1994-95, and Acharya (1999) .
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Both consumer and wholesale price inflation rose between 1993-95, the peak period of inflows and again in 1996-97, when inflows resumed.
Both real exchange rate behaviour and policy response in India bear a closer similarity with East Asian economies than the Latin American ones. The former mostly limited adjustment of their currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar, in contrast to the Latin American countries, particularly Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, who allowed much more exchange rate flexibility. Glick (1998: 8) has noted that though capital inflows have been associated with real exchange rate appreciation in both regions, the extent of real exchange rate appreciation in the Asian region was far less than the Latin American countries, presumably due to differences in policy response. Khan & Reinhart (1995) have pointed out that differences in composition of aggregate demand might account for this varied exchange rate response across the two regions. The investment/GDP ratio increased by 3.5 per cent for the Asian group of countries during the capital surge, but stagnated in the Latin American region, where private savings declined and consumption rose.
A similar comparison for India shows a 3. The behaviour of the real exchange rate in response to capital inflows has been an important area of concern and has been examined in several recent studies. Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) and Edwards (1999) have explored the association between capital inflows and real exchange rates for a set of Latin American countries.
They find substantial evidence that capital inflows contributed both to real exchange rate appreciation and reserves' accumulation in these countries. Is there any such evidence for India? We attempt a tentative exploration of this hypothesis in this paper.
The time-series properties of the two series show both net capital account and the real effective exchange rate (REER) to be stationary, I (0), processes. The stationarity of the real exchange rate is interesting, it follows the change in exchange rate regime in 1993 and validates purchasing power parity for the period. The mean-reverting nature of the real exchange rate in the 'managed float' period is however, linked to the PPP rule by which the float is managed rather than a market determined movement of the REER.
procedure, we conclude that both series are tied together in a long-run equilibrium relationship. 22 The bivariate relationship between net capital inflows and the real effective exchange rate is plotted in Fig. 6 below. The simple correlation coefficient between the two series is small, 0.11; data at monthly frequency 23 from 1995:01-2000:11 shows a correlation coefficient of 0.24. These correlations are small compared to Edwards' (1999) estimates for seven Latin American economies, which range between 0.14-0.72, but the Months After shock Cumulative Change in the REER direction of correlation is similar. Granger causality tests between the two variables show that the hypothesis that net capital inflows do not cause real exchange rates can be rejected 93 per cent of the time. Reverse causality, i.e. real exchange rates do not Granger cause net capital inflows, is however accepted.
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The λtrace statistic is 20.4, which exceeds the critical value of 20 at one percent, suggesting that the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector is rejected.
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This uses the series foreign investment inflows instead of the net capital account. The former is available only from 1995 onwards. See RBI Bulletin (October 1999) To illustrate the impact of capital inflows upon real exchange rates in India, we construct an impulse response function between the two series in Fig. 7 . The response function indicates that a one standard deviation surprise shock to net capital inflows, i.e. a net inflow of US $245 million in the first period causes the real exchange rate to appreciate by 1.2 per cent in the second month. The effect of the shock wears out over 48 months, i.e. 4 years. The impulse response indicates that unanticipated capital inflows shocks have significant effects in the first eight months after the surprise innovation and there is no significant effect thereafter.
Preliminary evidence for India therefore, corresponds to individual as well as cross-country evidence on the subject. This empirical evidence however, needs to be examined further in depth, for though fluctuations in real exchange rates can be attributed to capital inflows, they can also be affected by changes in the terms of trade, government spending and monetary as well as exchange rate policies. The importance of the exercise need hardly be emphasised as a significant implication of this result is that a rise in inward capital flows into the economy is likely to lead to losses in international competitiveness via real exchange rate appreciation. This has implications for exchange rate policy, which are spelt out in Section IV of the paper.
Reserve accumulation: Capital inflows can be traced to either international reserves' accumulation or a current account deficit, depending upon the exchange rate regime. If there is no intervention by the central bank, i.e. the exchange rate regime is a pure float, then the net increase in capital assets via capital inflows would be associated with a similar increase in imports and therefore a widening current account deficit. Alternately, if the exchange rate regime is fixed and the central bank intervenes to counter appreciation pressures, then capital inflows would be visible in increases in foreign exchange reserves. Since the two extremes are rarely observed in practice, the choice of intervention, or its size, narrows down to the degree of exchange rate flexibility desirable by the authorities and is, in essence, a policy choice.
Figs. 8 and 9 plot foreign exchange reserves and the current account deficit (per cent GDP) for India over 1970-99. The current account deficit is seen to be narrowing after touching 3.2 per cent in 1991, the year of crisis. The steep increase in foreign 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 per cent GDP 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 per cent GDP 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Year US$ 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Year US$ exchange reserves (Fig. 8) The intervention activities of the RBI have been extensively documented in Kohli (2000a, b) .
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One may also note at this point the conscious efforts made by the authorities to boost foreign exchange reserves through mobilisation of funds from non-resident Indians, viz. We acknowledge that real money stock is an ex post variable and thus cannot really be used to explain price level movements. There are other reasons for this rise. For example, financial scams in the early nineties made it difficult for banks to make other investments, inducing risk-averse behaviour. This reflected in increased investments in gilts.
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The reaction function was estimated using monthly data from 1993:03-2000:05. Lagged values of the explanatory variables, the prime lending rate, federal funds rate (US), as well as the real and nominal exchange rate were used as instruments. Seasonal dummies and a MA (1) term used in the estimation are not reported here.
indicating complete sterilisation. The output gap and lagged inflation are insignificant and of incorrect sign; the output gap was dropped in the final estimated equation.
Sensitivity analysis checks reveal the specification to be sensitive to treatment of the output gap as endogenous or exogenous, or lagged one period. The size of the offset coefficient remains unchanged but gains in significance when the output gap variable is dropped, inflation now enters with a correct sign but is insignificant. The size of the offset coefficient is robust to several variants of the reaction function (1.09) indicating a complete sterilisation. These estimates show that the RBI used domestic credit policy to attain internal policy objectives while engaging in sterilised intervention to influence/maintain the exchange rate. Sterilisation has several controversial implications, which are discussed in the next section.
IV Policy Implications and Conclusion
The experience with liberalization of controls on inward capital flows in India shows close similarities with other liberalising economies of Latin America and Asia. A striking difference between India and these economies is that the magnitude of capital inflows has not been very large in India so as to cause intensive macro and micromanagement problems. As such, the challenges faced by India, both in terms of impact upon important economic variables as well as macroeconomic management, have been far less. Notwithstanding these differences however, many attributes of the Indian experience, viz. inflow of foreign capital following the opening of markets, real exchange rate response, and monetary policy response, have been shown to bear strong similarities with these economies in this paper. Based on the analysis contained in this paper, the key policy issues of concern to India are of allowing the exchange rate to change, sterilisation, the soundness and capacity of the financial system to intermediate large It is significant that the distribution of capital flows between portfolio and FDI flows into India tilts distinctly towards the former in most years after liberalization.
Foreign direct investment does not reveal a stable trend so far. The relatively greater contribution of portfolio capital towards India's capital account, and the fact that these inflows could increase to significant levels in the future as India's financial markets get integrated globally, show that an important sphere of concern is their skillful management to facilitate smooth intermediation. There are two channels through which inward capital can be intermediated -the stock market or the banking system.
Preliminary evidence for India on the relationship between portfolio flows and some stock market indicators suggests that market prices are not unaffected by capital inflows.
This exposes the potential vulnerability of the economy to sudden withdrawals of foreign investors from the financial market, which will affect liquidity and contribute to market volatility. The state of development of India's financial markets, which are relatively thin and underdeveloped, is likely to be a severe constraint on intermediating heavy volumes of volatile, short-term capital, though it must be admitted in fairness that the volume of transactions in both foreign exchange and domestic money markets has been steadily increasing in the post-reform period. An increase in the volume of capital inflows, therefore, might necessitate excessive intermediation through the domestic banking sector. What are the implications for India in this regard?
If intermediated through the banking system, portfolio flows have a greater impact upon domestic monetary expansion. Sudden, uneven increases in intermediated funds will lead to an irregular expansion in the volume of domestic financial assets and liabilities. 35 Unless sterilised, the volume of bank lending is bound to rise and could lead to unscrupulous lending, which if it finances consumption or real estate, can trigger a consumption boom. Moral hazard risks are thus likely to increase, threatening financial instability, as transpired during the Asian crisis.
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A further source of expansion in loanable resources of the domestic banks could surface through impending financial reform measures like reduction in reserve requirements or disinvestment proceeds that might be deployed to retire internal public debt.
In such a scenario, a sound banking system is an essential pre-requisite. The state of the Indian banking system, particularly the public sector banks, is fragile. Many of them are under-capitalised, with large levels of non-performing loans on their balancesheets. Though India's financial reforms have consistently emphasised strengthening of prudential regulation and supervisory standards, sector as well as borrower-specific exposure limits exist, and liquidity requirements are in place, the capacity of these institutions to assess, price and manage risks is doubtful. These capacities can be created through structural changes and institutional reform of these institutions, which is still an unstarted agenda of financial reform in India.
The difference between net capital inflows and the current account deficit has so far been negative in India, as a consequence of which the impact upon the banking system has been small. Thus absorption by the central bank through sterilisation and utilisation of bank reserves for financing import payments (recall that capital inflows Since the current account deficit equals the difference between national saving and investment, imbalances in it can result from either a fall in savings or a rise in investment. A current account deficit stemming from a rise in investment is more desirable since it leads to an increase in productive capacity and economic growth. On the other hand, a fall in the savings rate driving the current account deficit indicates a rise in consumption. However, if capital inflows represent unrequited transfer of wealth, then consumers would rationally increase consumption. The net effects can be worked out through an intertemporal approach to balance of payments.
A second issue is the response of the real exchange rate to removal of capital account restrictions. This paper shows that capital inflows are associated with real appreciation in India. This is an area where conflicting policy choices are bound to arise.
On one hand, the policy option of stabilising the real exchange rate to keep it constant can be a source of potential conflict between external and internal objectives and it may not always be possible to reconcile the two. Intervening foreign currency purchases to stabilise the exchange rate and accumulation of foreign exchange reserves has implications for domestic monetary management, which can be seriously impaired by divided short-term monetary responses during a capital surge. Monetary policy therefore, has to be untangled from exchange rate policy to be able to respond effectively to domestic objectives.
The option of a more flexible exchange rate policy, which has the advantages of insulating domestic money supply, domestic credit and the banking system as well as discouraging speculation through increased exchange risk, carries with it the risk of appreciation. A significant implication of real appreciation is the loss in external competitiveness, which hurts exports. This, in turn, will lower the profitability of the trading sectors of the economy and disrupt the process of trade liberalization. Second, there are real adjustment costs associated with exchange rate changes, which, if the inflows are temporary, can severely disrupt economic processes within the economy 37 .
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See Calvo & Reinhart (2000) who provide evidence as to why developing countries fear floating exchange rates.
The major policy issue here is how much should the exchange rate be allowed to fluctuate or adjust, vis-a-vis the tradeoff between the real economic costs of exchange rate fluctuations and inflation. In other words, if the external sector has to be protected, how does one reconcile a stable exchange rate and simultaneously control domestic money supply with capital mobility. This is the familiar macroeconomic policy trilemma (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2001) where the conflict facing policymakers is the choice between a fixed exchange rate, capital mobility and an activist monetary policy, when only two of the three objectives can be chosen. One may also mention here that the policy option of protecting exports through subsidies, as a safeguard against adverse exchange rate movements, is now constrained by the current environment of globalisation and trade agreements.
One option that could be explored in the face of capital inflow surges is absorption by the external sector through encouraging capital outflows. The policy response during the 1993-97 surge did liberalise capital outflows to contain appreciation pressures. This response actually facilitated trade liberalization as it was possible to pursue import liberalisation despite the expected impact upon the current account. South Korea exercised this option successfully during its current account surplus of 1986-88 when it actively encouraged capital outflows by residents.
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The short experience with liberalization of capital inflows documented in this paper highlights the pressures of a capital surge upon domestic monetary management. It 38 Koo & Park (1994 for India at present and there is a need for empirical studies on this issue. The substantial rise in commercial banks' holdings of government securities by the banking system in the nineties, mentioned earlier in the paper, suggests that the burden of quasi-fiscal costs could be quite high.
Three, some researchers (for example, Folkerts-Landau et al, 1994) have noted that sterilisation through reserve requirement changes will not be effective in addressing capital inflows intermediated outside the banking system, i.e. bond and equity markets. This is a relevant issue for India for two reasons. First is the heavy dependence upon 39 Kletzer & Spiegel (2000) have extended the analysis further to incorporate the role quasi-fiscal costs might play in monetary policy for a group of APEC countries. Though they find these to be small in their influence upon central bank behaviour, they do find they might play a role in abandonment of a sterilisation programme in the midst of a capital surge.
reserve requirements as a policy tool for monetary management. To counter the impact of a capital surge upon the stock market, effective open market operations and a vibrant, active market for both government and private securities is a necessary prerequisite. The second consideration in this regard is that though a substantial amount of funds in India are still intermediated through the banking sector, its share in the total financial assets of the economy is steadily falling. Between 1990 and 1999, the banking sector's share has fallen from 66.8 to 64.2 per cent, being substituted by the rise of non-bank and investment institutions. 40 For instance, Spiegel (1995: 33) has noted that the more developed the non-financial sector, the less effective will be sterilisation policy through standard open market operations or through reserve requirement changes. With the structure of financial sector still evolving, and the dilution of the banking sector, the future effectiveness of reserve requirements is questionable. Other costs of sterilisation through reserve requirement changes is the low rates of return on they bear, which distorts the share of intermediation by the banking sector. Another source of loss to the central bank due to sterilisation is the interest differential between the interest rate on purchase of foreign exchange securities and the interest rate paid on external debt servicing (Spiegel, 1995: 18 The fall in the banking sector's assets in the total financial system might have implications for real exchange rate appreciation too. Evidence from Southeast Asia indicates that Korea, which had the largest non-bank financial sector, experienced the greatest degree of real exchange rate appreciation, the concern that the rupee needs to be protected from a speculative attack depleting foreign exchange reserves. A second weapon to counter external pressures emerging from capital account transactions is capital controls. There is no doubt, particularly in the aftermath of the currency crises, that capital controls have reemerged as a self-protection device to safeguard against heavy capital surge pressures. These can be effective in managing the external position, particularly in the short-run. Countries that have used them successfully include Israel (1978) , Chile (1991) and Malaysia (1998-99 ). Chile's example illustrates the successful use of dynamic and comprehensive policy in this context. Initially, when capital started flowing into Chile, it was perceived to be temporary and the Chilean authorities resisted nominal exchange rate appreciation, sterilising their purchases. When the flows persisted however, the authorities changed track, allowing greater exchange whereas countries with large shares of assets in the banking sector, had no, or moderate real exchange rate appreciation.
rate flexibility, lowering sterilisation and imposing restriction on capital inflows, particularly short-term capital. While some, like Khan & Reinhart (1995) , have argued that taxation of short-term flows can be subverted through over-invoicing and underinvoicing of imports and exports in the long-run, empirical evidence (Gregorio, Edwards & Valdes, 2000) shows that capital controls had a persistent and sizeable effect upon the composition of capital inflows in Chile, tilting them towards longer maturity. 
